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THE AVIATION INDUSTRY AND THE TRANSMISSION OF
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE: THE CASE OF HINI
SWINE INFLUENZA
COURTNEY CLEGG*
AIRPLANES ARE NOW a necessary feature of modern life,
allowing for the quick and convenient transportation of
both goods and passengers from one side of the world to an-
other in a matter of hours. Today air transport has replaced
ships as the primary carrier of passengers traveling internation-
ally; in fact, ninety-five percent of international travel is now by
air.' Although air travel has become a central feature of mod-
ern life, it is not without its problems. Among the problems is a
range of "threats to human health" that emerge from the nature
of airplane cabins, which lack fresh air and require the close
proximity of a large number of people in a small enclosed
space.2
In the past year, with the emergence of the H1N1 influenza,
more commonly referred to as the swine flu, air travel and the
spread of infectious disease have garnered much attention from
both the government and the public.' The outbreak also
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A. 2008, Southwestern University. The author would like to thank her parents,
Stephen and Cindy, for all of their support and encouragement throughout the
years.
I Usha Balasubramaniam, Air Passenger Health and Consumer Protection, 73 J. AIR
L. & COM. 675, 675 (2008).
2 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, International Responsibility in Preventing the Spread of
Communicable Diseases Through Air Carriage - The SARS Crisis, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 53, 53
(2002).
3 See, e.g., Aviation Consumer Issues: Emergency Contingency Planning and Outlook
for Summer Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 22-24 (2009) [hereinafter Aviation Consumer Is-
sues] (statement of Patricia A. Friend, International President, Association of
Flight Attendants).
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sparked concerns over the transmission of disease and the qual-
ity of air in airplane cabins.'
Airplanes assist in the spread of communicable diseases in two
distinct ways: (1) they facilitate the spread of new diseases from
one city or country to another;5 and (2) they allow for the trans-
mission of disease between passengers during flight.6 Both of
these problems have been acknowledged and addressed by a
myriad of different organizations, both national and interna-
tional, which have promulgated regulations and recommenda-
tions to help resolve concerns relating to the health of those
traveling on board airplanes.'
This comment will examine various actions taken by both in-
ternational and national organizations leading up to, and in re-
sponse to, the 2009 HINI outbreak, and it will analyze the
effectiveness of both the national and international responses to
the pandemic. It will explore the debate regarding air quality in
airplane cabins. Additionally, it will analyze how the aviation in-
dustry has been impacted by health regulations, looking particu-
larly at the International Health Regulations and the response
by various U.S. governmental departments. Part I will provide
historical information regarding epidemics, the International
Health Regulations, and the Federal Aviation Administration
and Center for Disease Control and Prevention. This history
will include background information related to the formation of
the organizations, focusing on those aspects that are relevant to
the aviation industry. Part II will discuss the ongoing debate be-
tween various experts regarding air quality in airplane cabins,
and Part III will examine and analyze the response to the swine
flu pandemic and consider what should be done in the future to
help prevent the spread of disease through air travel. This com-
4 Hugo Martin, Swine Flu Outbreak Revives Fears About Planes' Air Quality, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2009, at BI.
5 See, e.g., Elim Chan & Andreas Schloenhardt, The 2003 SARS Outbreak in Hong
Kong: A Review of Legislative and Boarder Control Measures, 2004 SING.J. LEGAL STUD.
484, 488-89 (2004).
6 See, e.g., Martin B. Hocking & Harold D. Foster, Common Cold Transmission in
Commercial Aircraft: Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENvrTL. HEALTH RES. 7, 7
(2004).
7 See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], Interim Gui-
dance for Management of Influenza-Like Illness Aboard Commercial Aircraft
During the 2009-10 Influenza Season (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/
hinlflu/guidance/air-crew-dom-intl.htm; World Health Org. [WHO], Interna-
tional Health Regulations, at 1-2 (2d ed. 2005), available at http://whqlibdoc.
who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf.
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ment will propose suggestions to improve pandemic-response
plans by recommending a more health-centered approach, as
opposed to an approach focused almost entirely on economic
considerations.
I. HEALTH CRISES AND AVIATION REGULATIONS
A. WORLDWIDE HEALTH CRISES DURING THE 20TH AND
21ST CENTURIES
Before delving into the current situation, it is worthwhile to
examine a brief history of worldwide health crises to understand
why both national and international governmental bodies have
grown concerned about the possibility of a devastating world-
wide pandemic. While the widespread increase in international
air travel definitely contributes to the spread of disease in to-
day's world,' worldwide pandemics occurred long before the ad-
vent of commercial aviation.' Most notably, in 1918, the
Spanish influenza pandemic spread to half the world's popula-
tion, killing approximately 50 million people worldwide and
600,000 in the United States alone.' 0
Nearly a century later, in 2003, the world was confronted with
another worldwide health scare." Concerns over the possibility
of another pandemic were revived when a strain of avian flu be-
gan spreading across Asia,12 eventually making its way to fifteen
countries, and resulting in 282 deaths.' 3
8 See Balasubramaniam, supra note 1, at 675-76.
9 See Resource4AviationLaw.com, History of Aviation, http://www.resource4
aviationlaw.com/topics/historyofaviation.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) ("Car-
riers for passenger service began in the 1920s . . . .").
10 Health Protection Agency, History of Pandemics (Aug. 13, 2008), http://
www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAwebC/1 19573377796
0?p=1191942171185#spanishflu.
11 See WHO, Avian Influenza ("Bird Flu") (Feb. 2006), http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/avianinfluenza/en/; see also WHO, The World Health Re-
port 2003, at 71 (2003), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whr03_en.
pdf.
12 WHO, About Avian Influenza (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.euro.who.int/
influenza/avian/20080618_21.
13 WHO, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza
A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
avianjinfluenza/country/cases_table_2009_12_30/en/index.html.
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1. The 2003 SARS Outbreak
Also, in early 2003, the world had its first encounter with se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)." On March 12, 2003,
the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the emer-
gence of SARs to the world.' 5 Within only a couple of days, it
became clear that the illness had spread and was continuing to
spread by air travel along major airline routes.'6 By August 7,
2003, the WHO had reported 8,422 SARS cases, resulting in 916
deaths worldwide.' 7
The SARS epidemic also illustrates the role that international
air travel plays in the spread and transmission of communicable
disease. SARS is transmitted when an individual comes in close
contact with someone who is infected, resulting in "exposure to
infected respiratory droplets expelled during coughing or sneez-
ing."'" SARS, which started in China, was spread around the
world by a physician who had treated an infected patient." The
infected physician traveled to Hong Kong, where he stayed in a
hotel and infected "at least sixteen other hotel guests and visi-
tors all linked to the same floor."20 When the guests returned
home in the following days, they spread the disease to Vietnam,
Singapore, and Canada. 2 1 In the case of SARS transmission, pas-
sengers on airplanes within three rows of an infected individual
were most at risk.2 2 On one flight, it was thought that one in-
fected passenger likely transmitted SARS to 22 out of 119 pas-
sengers on board.
Unfortunately for the aviation industry, the SARS outbreak
had an immensely negative impact on consumer perceptions of
the airline industry.2 4 Presumably due to people's fear that they
would be infected with SARS while traveling, the SARS outbreak
resulted in a larger decrease in international travel than the war
14 World Health Report 2003, supra note 11, at 71.
15 Id. at 73-74.
16 Id. at 73.
17 Id. at 75.
18 Id. at 74.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 74-75.
21 Id. at 75.
22 Air Travel 'Fuelled SARS Spread'BBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2003), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3329483.stm.
23 Id.
24 See Balasubramaniam, supra note 1, at 675-76.
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in Iraq." Worldwide, scheduled flights in June 2003 were down
3% from the year before with China and the Asia Pacific region
being hit the hardest.2 6 In fact, there was a forty-five percent
decrease in flights to China during the SARs outbreak.27 By the
end of the year, the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) indicated a 2.4% decrease in international travel in 2003
as compared to 2002.
2. The Emergence of HINI Influenza (Swine Fu)
Then, in 2009, the world came face to face with "its first pan-
demic in over forty years"-the HINI swine flu pandemic.
The outbreak started in Mexico on March 18, 2009,o and then
quickly spread to the United States and Canada."' Only two
months after the first reported case, 13,398 cases had been re-
ported in forty-eight countries.3 2 On April 26, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services declared a public-health
emergency.33 Then onJune 11, 2009, Margaret Chan, Director-
General of the WHO, raised the pandemic alert level from
phase 5 to phase 6, "thereby declaring the pandemic (H1N1)
2009.""3 Subsequently, on October 24, 2009, President Obama




28 International Aviation Transportation Association [IATA], IATA Interna-
tional Traffic Statistics: December 2003 (Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.iata.org/
pressroom/facts figures/traffic results/2004-01-28-01.htm.
29 Flu.gov, HINI Timeline: Meeting the Challenge, http://www.flu.gov/news/
blogs/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
30 WHO, Timeline of Influenza A (HIN1) Cases (May 27, 2009), http://www.
who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/history-map/InfluenzaAH1N1_maps.html.
31 WHO, Influenza-Like Illness in the United States and Mexico (Apr. 24,
2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en/; Timeline of Influenza A
(H1N1) Cases, supra note 30.
32 Influenza-Like Illness in the United States and Mexico, supra note 31.
3 Charles E.Johnson, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Determination That a Public Health Emergency Exists (Apr. 26, 2009), http://
www.hhs.gov/secretary/phe swh1nl-april_2009.html.
34 WHO, Pandemic Influenza (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.euro.who.int/
influenza/200806182 ("WHO uses a six-phased scale of pandemic alert to in-
form the world of the global spread of a new virus and as a global framework for
countries in pandemic preparedness and response planning .... Pandemic alert
phase 6 is defined as a new virus causing sustained community-level outbreaks in
more than one WHO region.").
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declared the 2009 H1NI pandemic a national emergency.15 As
ofJanuary 15, 2010, cases of HINI have been reported in more
than 208 countries, resulting in at least 13,554 deaths world-
wide.36 The number of reported cases continues to increase
daily.3 7 Just six years after the SARS outbreak, the world was
once again in the midst of a global health crisis, and concerns
regarding communicable disease and air travel were revived.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS
1. The Beginnings of International Cooperation and the
International Sanitary Regulations
The health crises discussed above reflect the need for interna-
tional cooperation in preventing the spread of disease. Starting
even before the outbreak of the 1918 Spanish influenza, the
need for international cooperation in the area of health was rec-
ognized. 8 As a result, the aviation industry in the United States
must be concerned not only with its national laws and regula-
tions, but also with those promulgated by international bodies."
The need for an international response to communicable dis-
ease epidemics is evident from the transnational nature of the
problem and the impossibility of containing communicable dis-
eases unless nations work together.40 This "globalization of pub-
lic health"4 1 has compelled international bodies to devise
approaches for solidified and effective action during worldwide
health emergencies. 42
3 Flu.gov, October 24, 2009 - President Obama Signs Emergency Declaration
for H1N1 Flu (Oct. 24, 2009), http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/h1n1
emergencyl0242009.html.
6 WHO, Pandemic (HIN1) 2009 - Update 83 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.
who.int/csr/don/2010_01_15/en/index.html.
3 Id.
3 Obijiofor Aginam, International Law and Communicable Diseases, 80 BULL.
WHO 946, 946-47 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/
80(12)946.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Balasubramaniam, supra note 1, at 685-87 (detailing provisions of
the WHO constitution that apply to the aviation industry).
40 See David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases and International Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 12, 15 (1997)
("The blurring of distinction between national and international health suggests
that the forces of globalization are undermining the sovereign state's ability to
prevent and control infectious diseases.").
41 Id. at 11 ("[T]he current EID [Emerging Infectious Disease] crisis has made
the globalization of public health a permanent feature of international
relations.").
42 Aginam, supra note 38, at 946.
[75442
HiNi SWINE INFLUENZA
The history of international concern over the spread of com-
municable diseases begins with the International Sanitary Con-
ferences, the first of which was held in France in 1851 in
response to the European cholera epidemics of 1830 and
1847.4' This European effort was followed soon after by the
Americas, whose first international health discussion was the In-
ter-American Sanitary Convention held in 1905.44 The conven-
tion required all nations involved to notify others of any cases of
cholera, plague, or yellow fever."5 This convention was followed
by the development of the Pan-American Sanitary Code, which
expanded the duty of notification from three diseases to ten.4 6
Subsequently, in 1948 the WHO was established as a special-
ized agency of the United Nations to deal specifically with inter-
national health issues, including issues related to aviation
health.4 7 In 1951, the WHO adopted the International Sanitary
Regulations (ISR) to provide "international standards for dis-
ease notification and for handling infected [travelers] and
goods."" Its "goal was to structure State responses to infectious
disease outbreaks . . . so that States could protect themselves
from disease importation and spread in ways that were scientifi-
cally effective and the least restrictive of trade and travel possi-
ble."49 The ISRs originally only applied to six infectious diseases
that were the most concerning at the time-smallpox, typhus,
relapsing fever, yellow fever, cholera, and plague.o
Even this initial version of the ISRs contained numerous pro-
visions relating to aviation and its role in the spread of commu-
nicable diseases.5 1  For example, it contained provisions
regarding vaccination requirements for international travel, a
43 Id. at 946-47.
44 Id. at 947.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization, in BASIC DOCUMENTS 1 n. 1
(45th ed. Supp. 2006), available at http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who-
constitutionen.pdf; see also Balasubramaniam, supra note 1, at 685-86 (detailing
provisions of the WHO constitution that apply to the aviation industry).
48 WHO, International Health Regulations, http://www.who.int/trade/
glossary/story060/en/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
49 David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Secur-
ity: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2005).
-o See, e.g., WHO, International Sanitary Regulations, at 9 (May 25, 1951), available
at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHOTRS_41.pdf (defining quarantinable dis-
eases to include "plague, cholera, yellow fever, small pox, typhus, and relapsing
fever").
51 See, e.g., id. at 18-24.
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State's duty to report any cases of disease caused by interna-
tional traffic, sanitation at airports and of aircraft, measures con-
cerning the international transport of goods and baggage, and a
multitude of other regulations regarding aviation-related health
concerns. 52
2. 1969 International Health Regulations
In 1969, the ISRs were renamed International Health Regula-
tions (IHR)53 and were subsequently revised again to regulate
only cholera, plague, and yellow fever, instead of the original
six.54
Despite the WHO's best efforts, the 1969 version of the IHRs
ultimately proved to be ineffective at providing a desirable inter-
national approach to communicable disease.5 5 This was due to
"the lack of an enforcement mechanism," as well as the eco-
nomic situations in the developing world that made the "notifi-
cation certification, and hygienic transport [requirements] ...
unfeasible."5 6 Also, the early version of the IHRs "ultimately
doomed the system because it provided no guidance for dealing
with new and unknown infectious diseases" other than the three
diseases listed in the 1969 revision.57 As a result of the above
drawbacks and following the outbreaks of avian flu and SARS in
2003, the World Health Assembly adopted the revised IHRs in
2005.58 The revised IHRs became binding on member states on
June 15, 2007," shortly before the 2009 swine flu pandemic
began.
3. The 2005 Revised International Health Regulations
The revised IHRs are broader in scope and "emphasize[ ] col-
lective action to prevent, detect, and contain any type of public
52 Id. at 9-11, 15-21.
53 International Health Regulations, supra note 48.
54 Timeline of Influenza A (HINI) Cases, supra note 30.
55 Timothy J. Miano, Understanding and Applying International Infectious Disease
Law: U.N. Regulations During an H5N1 Avian Flu Epidemic, 6 CHI.-KENTJ. INT'L &
Comp. L. 26, 31 (2006).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 32.
58 Id.; World Health Assembly, May 16-25, 2005, WHA 58.3: Revision of the Inter-
national Health Regulations, 8 (May 23, 2005), available at http://apps.who.int/gb/
ebwha/pdf files/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf.




health event that might constitute a global threat."" The revi-
sions greatly expanded the scope of the IHRs, which now "apply
to diseases (including those with new and unknown causes), ir-
respective of origin or source, that present significant harm to
humans."6 1 The revised IHRs also contain a framework specifi-
cally designed for responding to an influenza pandemic.62
Under the new IHRs, the "disease-specific framework" has
been replaced with a new approach that encompasses a broader
range of diseases and circumstances.6 ' As a result, the new IHRs
allow for regulation of pandemics just like the HIN1 pandemic
that the world is currently experiencing. 4 In fact, the HIN1
outbreak prompted the Director-General of the WHO to de-
clare a "public health emergency of international concern."65
This was "the first time that declaration had been used under
the newly revised [IHR]."" According to the revised IHRs, a
"public health emergency of international concern" is an event
that poses a public health risk to other States through the inter-
national spread of disease and to potentially require a coordi-
nated international response. 7
While significant changes were made in the revision process,
the main goal of the IHRs remains the same-"protecting inter-
national health security with the least interference to interna-
tional travel and trade."" Article 3.4 of the revised IHRs
provides that "States have ... the sovereign right to legislate and
to implement legislation in pursuance of their health policies
.... In doing so they should uphold the purpose of these Regu-
o GEORGE WASHINGTON SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS. & THE HOME-
LAND SEC. POLICY INST. RAPID PUB. HEALTH POLICY RESPONSE PROJECT, THE H1N1
INFLUENZA A VIRUS: A TEST CASE FOR A GLOBAL RESPONSE 3 (2009) [hereinafter
GEORGE WASHINGTON SCHOOL], available at http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/
about/rapidresponse/download/RapidSwineFluFinal.pdf.
61 WHO, International Health Regulations 2005: Guidance for National Policy-Mak-
ers and Partners, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/
3C5F7E4B-A7E5-41E-9759-BODC7D7FF564/0/IHR booklet_2007_web.pdf.
62 Id.
63 Fidler, supra note 40, at 361-62.
- GEORGE WASHINGTON SCHOOL, supra note 60, at 3 ("The broader approach
now in effect emphasizes collective action to prevent, detect, and contain any
type of public health event that might constitute a global threat.").
65 WHO, Swine Influenza - Statement by WHO Director-General, Dr. Mar-
garet Chan (Apr. 25, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_25/en/.
6 GEORGE WASHINGTON SCHOOL, supra note 60, at 2.
67 International Health Regulations, supra note 7, at 9.
68 International Health Regulations 2005: Guidance for National Policy-Makers and
Partners, supra note 61, at 4.
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lations." 69 Article 23 of the revised IHRs allows, for public
health purposes, the performance of a "non-invasive medical ex-
amination [upon arrival or departure of travelers] which is the
least intrusive examination that would achieve the public health
objective."7 ' The question that will be addressed later is
whether the United States' response to the swine flu was in line
with these objectives.
C. THE FAA AND THE CDC
Both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have been in-
volved in providing regulations and guidance to airlines and air-
ports relating to the spread of communicable diseases.71 The
CDC originated as part of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services in 1946 to combat malaria. 2 The mission of
the organization is "to collaborate to create the expertise, infor-
mation, and tools that people and communities need to protect
their health-through health promotion, prevention of disease,
injury and disability, and preparedness for new health threats."7
The CDC and its actions are relevant to the aviation industry, as
the CDC is concerned with "prevent[ing] disease outbreaks"
and "guard [ing] against international disease transmission."7
In guarding against international transmission of swine flu, the
CDC was the main source of information for both passengers
and airlines, providing guidance to both groups relating to the
HIN1 pandemic.
69 International Health Regulations, supra note 7, at 10.
70 Id. at 20.
71 See, e.g., Interim Guidance for Management of Influenza-Like Illness Aboard
Commercial Aircraft During the 2009-10 Influenza Season, supra note 7; Memo-
randum from FAA, S. Region Airports Div., Airport Certification Safety Inspec-
tion Team to All 14 CFR part 139 Airport Operators (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.faa.gov/airports/southern/airport-safety/partl 39_cert/certalerts/
media/so certalert_0905.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from FAA, S. Region].
72 CDC, Our History - Our Story, http://www.cdc.gov/about/history/our
story.htm (last visited July 7, 2010).
73 CDC, CDC Organization, http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/cio.htm
(last visited July 7, 2010).
74 Our History - Our Story, supra note 72.
75 See, e.g., CDC, Outbreak Notice: 2009 HINI Flu: Global Situation (Oct. 15,
2009), http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/content/outbreak-notice/novel-h In 1-flu-
global-situation.aspx; Interim Guidance for Management of Influenza-Like Ill-
ness Aboard Commercial Aircraft During the 2009-10 Influenza Season, supra
note 7.
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The other agency that has a tremendous impact on issues sur-
rounding the aviation industry and communicable disease is the
FAA.7 6 While the FAA regulates a multitude of civil aviation ac-
tivities, this comment will address only those regulations that re-
late to the spread of disease on aircraft-namely those relating
to air quality in airplane cabins and passenger health. This com-
ment will also suggest other actions that the FAA could possibly
take to help promote passenger health and prevent the interna-
tional spread of disease.
II. CABIN AIR QUALITY
A. THE DEBATE OVER AIR QUALITY IN AIRPLANE CABINS
1. History of the Debate Regarding Cabin Air Quality
Over the last few decades, airplane passengers and crew have
voiced concerns about cabin air quality.77 Questions regarding
the quality of air in airplane cabins have been raised not only
with respect to the spread of communicable diseases but also in
debates concerning smoking in airplane cabins.78  Most re-
cently, people, both inside and outside of the aviation industry,
have also expressed concern about toxic fume events.
In the 1980s, two major concerns of both passengers and crew
were smoking in airplane cabins and the effects of secondhand
76 See, e.g., Memorandum from FAA, S. Region, supra note 71,
77 See generally Aircraft Air Quality: What's Wrong With It and What Needs to be Done:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, H. Comm. of Transp. and Infrastructure,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Association of Flight Attendants), available at
http://www.afanet.org/legislative/aircraft-air-quality_61303.pdf [hereinafter
Association of Flight Attendants] (expressing concerns of flight attendants re-
garding aircraft air quality); Sabatino v. Boeing Corp., No. 09 C 1551, 2009 WL
1635670, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2009) (involving passengers who were exposed to
contaminated air while flying).
78 See Cabin Air Quality: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm.
on Transp. and Infrastructure, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of William W.
Nazaroff, Professor of Environmental Engineering, University of California,
Berkeley), available at http://www.nationalacademics.org/ocga/testimony/Air
craftCabinEnvironment.asp [hereinafter Cabin Air Quality].
79 Fume events occur when oil mixes with the compressed air resulting in
fumes or smoke entering the airplane cabin. See Aerotoxic Association, About
Aerotoxic Syndrome, http://www.aerotoxic.org/index.php/about-aerotoxic-syn
drome (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); see also Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Forensic Aspects of
the Aerotoxic Syndrome, 21 MED. & L. 179, 180-83 (2002) (providing a discussion
on the causes of fume events and symptoms of aerotoxic syndrome; complica-
tions include "gastro-intestinal, respiratory and nervous system effects," along
with blurred vision, "memory impairment, shaking and tremors, nausea/vomit-
ing, vertigo and loss of consciousness").
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smoke on non-smoking passengers.80 In response to these con-
cerns, in 1986 Congress requested a report about air quality in
airplane cabins from the National Research Council (NRC).81
The final report, The Airliner Cabin Environment: Air Quality and
Safety, recommended "the elimination of smoking on domestic
airline flights," as well as various other steps that the govern-
ment could take to improve air quality and promote the health
of those on board aircraft.12 The FAA subsequently took action
by banning smoking on all domestic flights." In addition,
under 14 C.F.R. § 252.5, foreign carriers must prohibit smoking
on scheduled passenger flights between points in the United
States and also "between the U.S. and any foreign point.""
Most of the concerns regarding the spread of disease in air-
planes involve the ventilation systems currently in place, but ex-
perts' opinions on the exact source of the problem differ
widely. 5 Until the 1990s, aircraft cabins were provided with
100% fresh air; however, in the '90s, manufacturers began build-
ing aircraft ventilation systems in such a way as to allow for the
recycling of air." The reasoning for this change was that re-
cycling air conserved fuel, thus lowering the airlines' operating
costs.87
In 1996, the Code of Federal Regulations was amended in or-
der to reflect this change in ventilation system design." As
amended, the relevant regulation allowed for the use of ventila-
tion systems that combine fresh air with uncontaminated, recir-
culated air. 9 Currently, under 14 C.F.R. § 25.831, "the
80 See Revreby v. United Airlines, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 260, 261 (Iowa 1980) (pas-
senger filed suit against airline after experiencing discomfort as a result of the
smoking by other passengers).
81 See Cabin Air Quality, supra note 78 (statement of William W. Nazaroff).
82 Id.
83 14 C.F.R. § 252.3 (2010) ("Air carriers shall prohibit smoking on all sched-
uled passenger flights.").
84 14 C.F.R. § 252.5 (2009).
85 Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 55-56 (blaming the re-circulation of air and lack
of fresh air for air quality problems); Hocking & Foster, supra note 6, at 10 (at-
tributing air quality problems to depressed humidity and inadequate supply of
outside air).
86 Forensic Aspects of the Aerotoxic Syndrome, supra note 79, at 187-88.
87 Id. at 188.
88 Standards for Approval for High Altitude Operation of Subsonic Transport
Airplanes, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,684-28,685 (June 5, 1996) (codified as 14 C.F.R.
§ 25.831).
Id. at 28,685 ("permits a ventilation system that uses a mixture of the mini-
mum amount of fresh air and any desired quantity of recirculated air that is
shown to be uncontaminated by odors, particulates, or gases").
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ventilation system must be designed to provide a sufficient
amount of uncontaminated air to enable the crewmembers to
perform their duties without undue discomfort or fatigue and to
provide reasonable passenger comfort.""o The regulation also
requires "the ventilation system .. . be designed to provide each
occupant with an airflow containing at least 0.55 pounds of fresh
air per minute."9
In 2000, Congress directed the FAA to ask the NRC to under-
take another study into cabin air quality. 2 Two years later the
NRC produced a report entitled, The Airliner Cabin Environment
and the Health of Passengers and Crew." The report concluded
that although disease transmission in airplane cabins has been
documented, the transmission is due to the "high occupant den-
sity and the proximity of passengers" and not to aircraft ventila-
tion systems." But the report is not the end of the story, as
there is a wide debate among researchers concerning whether
disease transmission on airplanes is really due solely to the prox-
imity of individuals, or if the ventilation system does play a role
in facilitating transmission."
Vice PresidentJoe Biden revived concerns regarding transmis-
sion of disease and quality of air in airplane cabins in his re-
sponse to the swine flu outbreak.96 To the dismay of the
aviation industry, in one highly publicized remark, Biden "told a
television audience that he [advised] family members to avoid
confined spaces such as airplanes" as a result of the HINI out-
break.97 Whether his concern was warranted is up for debate, as
studies regarding cabin air quality and the risks associated with
contracting an illness while traveling on an airplane have pro-
duced mixed results.9 8
90 14 C.F.R. § 25.831 (2010).
91 Id.
92 See Cabin Air Quality, supra note 78 (statement of William W. Nazaroff).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 53-56; Hocking & Foster, supra note 6, at
7-11.
96 Martin, supra note 4, at B.
97 Id.
98 Compare Hocking & Foster, supra note 6, at 8 ("the public perception that
flying promotes colds is correct"), with Cabin Air Quality, supra note 78 (statement
of William W. Nazaroff) (NRC concluded that disease "[t]ransmission does not
appear to be facilitated by aircraft ventilation systems.").
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2. Different Perspectives on the Air Quality Issue-What Exactly is
the Problem?
Those who believe that air quality in airplane cabins is poor
and contributes to the spread of disease have characterized air-
plane cabins as "veritable incubator[s] of potential disease" that
are dirtier than "floors in locker room showers."" Researchers
have attributed poor air quality in airplane cabins to a variety of
sources including filters,10 restricted air flow, recirculated air,101
lack of outside air, and low humidity. 102 Due to differing opin-
ions regarding the nature of the problem, there is also a wide
variety of opinions regarding what should be done to solve the
problem.10 The following discussion will summarize the differ-
ent suggestions as to the cause of the problem as well as solu-
tions that have been proposed.
While air filters have been touted as an adequate solution to
problems of air quality, they have also been criticized.' 0 4 Ac-
cording to John Moorehead, a researcher with the Battelle Me-
morial Institute, filters are "virtually clogged with fungus, yeast,
bacteria, and dust," and are providing an environment for dan-
gerous microbes to grow instead of killing them.' The Interna-
tional Air Transport Association's (JATA) publication, "General
Guidelines for Maintenance Crew," supports this notion.0 6 The
IATA warns maintenance crew that the high efficiency particu-
late air (HEPA) filters "may contain microorganisms trapped in
their meshes" and advises those handling the filters to "apply
99 Special Report: Cabin Safety: Contaminated Cabins Can Spread Disease, AIR SAFETY
WK., Mar. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 5398782.
100 Id. (discussing problems associated with air filters).
101 Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 55-56 (source of problem is the recirculation of
"stale air").
102 Hocking & Foster, supra note 6, at 10 (attributing problems with air quality
to low humidity and inadequate supply of outside air).
103 See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (proposing that cabins be humidified with de-ionized
water); Special Report: Cabin Safety: Contaminated Cabins Can Spread Disease, supra
note 99 (recommending that air filters be treated); Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 55
(suggesting to airlines that air filters should be changed more frequently).
104 See, e.g., Special Report: Cabin Safety: Contaminated Cabins Can Spread Disease,
supra note 99.
105 Id. ("The grow-through to the far side was evidenced in filters with between
5-13 months of in-service time-well short of an 18-month replacement cycle.").





reasonable precautions."1 0 7  Despite this problem, "buying
cheaper filters and replacing them more often" is not the solu-
tion, according to one researcher, because less expensive filters
are "not as effective."10 Instead, one recommendation ad-
vanced at the 17th Annual International Cabin Safety Sympo-
sium is to treat the filters with a mix of peroxide, ozone, and
oxygen ions. 0 ' This will allow for the killing of dangerous mi-
crobes without the fungal buildup.' Anti-microbial coatings
could also be applied to the aircraft's ducting in order to pro-
vide a healthier cabin environment."
Others believe that poor air quality is not a result of filters but
rather is due to recirculated (rather than fresh) air in the
cabin."' The proponents of this theory believe that the source
of the air quality problem is the recirculation of "stale air,"
which results in an "increase [ed] . . . chance of survival of bacte-
ria in the aircraft cabin."" 3 Also, though recirculated air has the
supposed advantage of being more humid, "the source of hu-
midification is your neighbors' breath."' 1 4 Ruwantissa
Abeyratne, a senior official with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), suggests that changing the air filters that
provide ventilation more frequently would assist in solving the
problems associated with recirculated air.61 5 However, the prac-
tice of "buying cheaper filters and replacing them more often"
has been explicitly rejected by others, who doubt the effective-
ness of cheaper filters." 6 In addition, the more frequent re-
placement of the high quality filters would likely lead to a
significant increase in costs to the airlines. Therefore, the best
107 Id. (specifically advises crew that when replacing the HEPA filters they
should "(1) Wear disposable Gloves; (2) Avoid hitting, dropping, or shaking the
filter;" (3) Refrain from using "compressed air to try and clean a filter;" (4) Dis-
pose of the filter "in a sealed plastic bag [and p]ut the used disposable gloves in
the same plastic bag;" and (5) "Wash hands with soap and water when the task is
finished.").





112 Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 55-56.
113 Id. at 56.
114 Association of Flight Attendants, supra note 77.
15 Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 55.
116 Special Report: Cabin Safety: Contaminated Cabins Can Spread Disease, supra note
99 (claiming that more frequent replacement of filters is not the solution).
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solution may be to treat the filters with a killing agent as sug-
gested above. 17
Martin Hocking, a chemist at the University of Victoria in Ca-
nada, believes the restricted use of outside air and low humidity
in airplane cabins enables the spread of influenza." In a study
published in the Journal of Environmental Health Research,
Hocking determined that airplane passenger transmission rates
for colds were found to be 113 times the normal ground-level
transmission rates, confirming the public's perception that fly-
ing increases one's chances of acquiring an illness."'9 The study
concluded that the increased transmission rates were likely a re-
sult of a combination of dry cabin air, "small cabin air space per
person, and low outside air replacement rates.""o The lack of
humidity in the airplane cabin allegedly prevents the proper
functioning of the natural human defense system in fighting vi-
ruses and bacteria. 12 1 Also, other studies suggest that the re-
stricted air flow and lack of outside air increase the residence
time of infectious diseases, thereby increasing the possibility of
exposure to a disease.'2 2 Abeyratne has proposed a return to
the pre-1990s method of using 100% fresh air that is humidified
as a solution to the low humidity.12' But this would lead to in-
creased fuel consumption, driving up costs for airlines.124 An-
other solution proposed by Hocking is to increase the humidity
of aircraft air with de-ionized water.1 25 However, another ex-
pert, while admitting that low humidity is a factor in the spread
of influenza in aircraft, believes that "[a]dding humidity to the
cabin environment could worsen the situation" by aiding micro-
bial growth."' In the end, increasing humidity in order to re-
duce transmission of disease appears to create more problems
117 See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
118 Hocking & Foster, supra note 6, at 10.
119 Id. at 7-8.
120 Id. at 7. The study also found that recirculation of aircraft air was not a
significant factor in the increased transmission rates. Id.
121 Id. at 10.
122 See, e.g., Association of Flight Attendants, supra note 77. "Residence time"
refers to "the length of time that an infectious agent stays airborne." Id.
123 Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 55-56.
124 Id. ("[R]ecycling is a universal practice, which is calculated to conserve fuel
125 Hocking & Foster, supra note 6, at 7-8.




than it solves.' 2 7 As a result, increasing humidity may not be the
right solution.
3. Other Proposed Actions to Help Improve Air Quality
According to presenters at the 17th Annual International
Cabin Safety Symposium, there are a number of measures that
can, and arguably should, be adopted to help solve the problem
of transmitting diseases in the airplane cabin.' 2 8 These sugges-
tions include simple steps such as screening passengers and dis-
infecting cabin surfaces, as well as more long-term solutions like
incorporating recirculation-free zones in the cabin designed to
isolate infected passengers from healthy ones.12 9 Another pro-
posed solution is to "reverse the direction of cabin airflow, from
top down to bottom up.""'o This way "any contaminated air
would tend to be drawn up and away from people, reducing the
opportunity for transmission of pathogens."' 33
Another promising solution to air quality problems lies in new
technology that has recently been developed by BAE Systems
and has been successfully tested on aircraft. 1 32 Last year, BAE
introduced a new cabin air management system named
AirManager.3 3 The inventor of the technology claims that the
new system is able to destroy a variety of contaminants very
quickly-killing "99.999% of bio-hazards and remov[ing] parti-
cles down to below 0.1 micron"1 3 4 in a single pass.13 1 While the
airline industry currently touts HEPA filters as the solution to air
quality concerns, the new technology "provides far greater re-
duction of airborne contaminants" than is achieved by HEPA
filters.1 3 6 Other positives include the fact that the AirManager
has potential for fuel savings and is easy to install.' 7 The com-






132 Sarah Gale, Cabin Air Management Technology Sets New Standar[d]s for Airline
Industry, AVIATION NEWS, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.aviationnews.us/print.php?
artid=9385.
133 Id.
134 Id. One micron is equal to one-millionth of a metre-the size of a single
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effectively, fuel savings could cover the purchase cost of
AirManager in the first year.'3 8 Additionally, installation of the
system "can be achieved during overnight line maintenance."13
While this new technology might seem like the perfect solu-
tion to cabin air quality problems, equipping airplanes with this
new technology could be difficult. Generally speaking, airlines
respond unfavorably to requirements to install new and expen-
sive equipment, especially when they do not see an economic
benefit from doing so.140
Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis of the AirManager system is
necessary. Costs of the system would be those associated with
purchasing, installing, and maintaining the new equipment.
The benefits would potentially be increased air quality, in-
creased crew and passenger health, and potential fuel savings.
However, it is questionable whether installation would increase
the demand for air travel even during a communicable-disease
outbreak. If the new system was effective in achieving a sense of
security among the public, the installation might be worth the
costs. Also, depending on the amount of fuel savings the new
system could provide, that alone might be enough to convince
airlines that equipping their airplanes with the new system
would be worth it.
Another option would be for the FAA to simply recommend
the use of AirManager instead of requiring it, but voluntary
compliance with this recommendation would probably be un-
likely, unless the airline companies saw some advantage to fol-
lowing the recommendation. Airlines might be persuaded to
install the new system voluntarily if, as the inventor claims, it
would result in a significant amount of fuel savings or if it would
increase the public's desirability of the airline. 41
AirManager could also enter the industry by way of consumer
demand. Should AirManager be installed in some aircraft and
be found superior to the HEPA filters, other airlines may be
138 Id.
1s9 Id.
140 See Industry Questions NPRM on ADS-B Out, AVIATION TODAY (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/Industry-Questions-NPRM-on-ADS-
B-Out_20009.html; see also FAA's Proposed SDR Revisions Receive Scathing Reviews,
AVIATION TODAY (Sept. 26, 2005), http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/
FAAs-Proposed-SDR-Revisions-Receive-Scathing-Reviews_3052.html.
141 Gale, supra note 132 (claiming that AirManager operates more effectively
than current systems, and that installation allows for potential fuel savings that
would cover the cost of the new system within one year).
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forced to follow suit to remain competitive in the industry. An-
other possibility would be for the FAA to implement some form
of equipage incentive program, as has been done in the past
with regard to Automatic Dependence Surveillance Broad-
cast.1 2 Such a program would encourage equipage by the air-
lines despite the high costs that can be associated with installing
new equipment.143
As illustrated above, there are plenty of people with negative
thoughts about the airplane cabin's potential for spreading
communicable disease and plenty of suggested solutions. But
others, including the Air Transport Association, downplay the
threat by maintaining that "air onboard a commercial aircraft is
cleaner than that in most public buildings"144 and by declaring
the belief that a person on a plane is more susceptible to influ-
enza to be a myth.'4 5 The FAA also disagrees with attacks on the
adequacy of airplane ventilation systems, stating in its response
to the NRC's report examining cabin air quality that problems
of disease transmission are a result of the passengers' close prox-
imity; therefore, changes in ventilation will not minimize disease
transmission.146
These varying opinions form the basis of the primary com-
plaint by the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) and the
NRC, which is an inadequate supply of published, objective data
relating to cabin air quality and the transmission of communica-
142 FAA, Surveillance and Broadcast Services, Western Service Area (WSA)
(Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquarters-offices/
ato/service_units/enroute/surveillancebroadcast/wsa/seip/ ("The 'Aircraft
Safety Equipage Incentive Program' was developed by the FAA and Alaskan avia-
tion industry, working through the Agreement Implementation Committee to
expedite equipage of Alaska-based aircraft with ADS-B avionics.").
143 Id.
144 Letter from James C. May, President & CEO, Air Transp. Ass'n, to Joe
Biden, Vice President (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.airlines.org/
government/letters/2009/A+LetterTmo+Vice+President+Biden+onshe+H1Ni+
Flu+Outbreak.htm; see also IATA, Briefing Paper Cabin Air Quality-Risk of Contagious
Viruses (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.iata.org/SiteCollectionDocuments
/cabin air quality.pdf ("The overall risk of contracting a disease from an ill per-
son onboard an airplane is similar to that in other confined areas with high occu-
pant density, such as a bus, a subway, or movie theatre for a similar time of
exposure . . . anywhere where a person is in close contact with others.").
145 Martin, supra note 4, at BI.
146 FAA, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
REPORT: THE AIRLINER CABIN ENVIRONMENT AND THE HEALTH OF PASSENGERS AND
CREw 8 (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/cabin
safety/rec_impl/media/adminreport02_06_2002.doc.
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ble diseases in the airplane environment.14 7 Reportedly, indus-
try executives also believe that "the absence of airline cabin
standards is a result of disagreement on what constitutes safe
air."I48
4. What Should Be Done to Improve Air Quality, if Anything?
The appropriateness of measures designed to improve cabin
air quality depends entirely on whether there is a problem and,
if so, what the exact source of the problem is. Therefore, in
developing solutions and a plan for future action, it must first be
determined whether air quality significantly increases the likeli-
hood of disease transmission or if the increase in transmission is
purely incident to the close proximity of a large group of people
in an enclosed space. As seen from the above discussion, pro-
posed suggestions for improving air quality range from the
quick and easy to the more long-term and demanding. Both the
AFA and the NRC have expressed the need for a more complete
and objective review of air quality. Such research is necessary, as
it would allow for the development of more accurate views on
cabin air quality and hopefully lead to an adequate solution, if
one is needed. For now, the FAA has refused to require airlines
to take any steps to improve air quality,14 9 and it continues to
stick to its position that the cabin environment is no less healthy
than other enclosed spaces.'
147 Association of Flight Attendants, supra note 77 (claims the shortage of ob-
jective data on the issue is due to "the near-refusal of airlines and manufacturers
to allow researchers financially independent of the airline industry access to air-
craft, and the FAA's apparent refusal to institute and manage a centralized air
quality incident reporting system"); see also Cabin Air Quality, supra note 78 (state-
ment by William W. Nazaroff).
148 Martin Tolchin, Inquiry Will Check Air Quality on Airplanes, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 1993, at A16.
149 Scott McCartney, The Middle Seat: Why Air Quality on Planes Can Seem Stag-
nant, WALL ST.J.,July 16, 2009, at D1 (concerning the FAA's failure to take action
on air quality).
150 Jon L. Jordan, The Cabin Air Quality Issue, in THE FEDERAL AIR SURGEON'S
COLUMN (June 22, 2005), http://www.faa.gov/library/reports/medical/fasmb/
editorialsjj/airquality/ ("When compared to known air quality in many homes,
office buildings, or other enclosed spaces where people congregate, the air qual-
ity in air carrier operations appears to be equivalent or superior.").
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III. AVIATION'S RESPONSE TO SWINE FLU
A. RESPONSE TO SWINE FLU IN THE UNITED STATES
Despite the FAA's consistent refusal to implement more strin-
gent air quality regulations,15 1 it did provide guidance to airlines
following the swine flu outbreak. 152 On April 29, 2009, just days
after the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services had
declared a public health emergency,'15 the FAA recommended
that air carriers follow CDC recommendations regarding swine
flu. 154 It also heavily emphasized the need for airports that had
not already done so to develop pandemic flu plans, taking into
account guidance from the CDC and the ICAO.15 5 In May 2009,
the FAA continued to maintain that a department-wide-pan-
demic-influenza plan was in place and that it was "safe to fly." 156
Furthermore, despite the growing concern over the possibility
of an H1N1 pandemic, the United States, based on guidance
from the CDC and the WHO, "opted to not conduct either entry
or exit health screening of international passengers." 57
The United States' approach to air travel during the swine flu
outbreak was to shift responsibility for containment of the swine
flu onto the passengers themselves.158 The CDC recommended
that efforts to minimize the international spread of swine flu fo-
cus on encouraging those with flu-like symptoms not to travel.'15
151 McCartney, supra note 149 (concerning the FAA's failure to take action on
air quality).
152 See, e.g., FAA, Safety Alert for Operators 09009, Apr. 29, 2009, available at
http://www.faa.gov/othervisit/aviationindustry/airline_operators/airlinesafe
ty/safo/all_safos/media/2009/SAFOO9009.pdf.
153 Johnson, supra note 33 (declaring a public health emergency on April 26,
2009).
154 Safety Alert for Operators 09009, supra note 152.
155 Memorandum from FAA, S. Region, supra note 71; see also Memorandum
from Michael W. Brown, Manager, Airport Safety & Operations Div. AAS-300, to
FAA Airport Certification Safety Inspectors (July 16, 2009), available at http://
www.faa.gov/airports/airport safety/certalerts/media/cert09l2.pdf.
156 Aviation Consumer Issues, supra note 3, at 5.
157 Aviation Consumer Issues: Emergency Contingency Planning and Outlook for Sum-
mer Travel: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Aviation, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastruc-
ture, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Nancy Lobue, Acting Assistant
Administrator, Aviation Policy, Planning, and Environment), available at http://
www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news-story.cfm?newsld=10581.
158 Interim Guidance for Management of Influenza-Like Illness Aboard Com-
mercial Aircraft During the 2009-10 Influenza Season, supra note 7.
159 Id. ("The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends
that efforts to reduce the spread of influenza on commercial aircraft focus on
encouraging air carrier employees and passengers who have an influenza-like ill-
ness (ILI) not to travel.").
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The CDC also focused its time on providing information about
flu prevention, such as washing your hands and covering your
cough.160 The CDC made posters, such as the one in Figure A






In response to these recommendations, a number of airports
and airlines took actions such as placing alcohol-based hand
sanitizer in airports, removing pillows and blankets from flights,
and adding hand sanitizer to planes.62 The CDC even
launched a Travel Health Campaign in an attempt to encourage
healthy travel.'6 3 It produced posters such as those found in Fig-
ure B, to provide health tips to air travelers.'16
16o See, e.g., Outbreak Notice: 2009 H1N1 Flu: Global Situation, supra note 75.
16, CDC, Cover Your Cough (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/Flu/protect/
covercough.htm (providing the public with instructions on how to properly cover
your cough and clean your hands).
162 Martin, supra note 4.
163 CDC, Travel Health Campaign: Are Any of these Posters Hanging Around
Your Town? (Nov. 19, 2009), http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/content/hlnl-camp
aign-posters.aspx.
164 Id. (The posters contain tips for healthy travel: "Travel only when you feel





Travel only when you feel well.
* Get your flu vaccine.
* Wash your hands often.
* Cover your coughs and sn
The CDC also promulgated "Interim Guidance for Manage-
ment of Influenza-Like Illness aboard Commercial Aircraft dur-
ing the 2009-10 Influenza Season."' 6 5 These guidelines included
recommendations for flight crew in the instance that a passen-
ger might experience flu-like symptoms during a flight.166 The
CDC suggested that in dealing with such a passenger crew mem-
bers should: (1) "Minimize the number of persons directly ex-
posed to the ill person and if possible separate the ill person
from others by 6 feet . . . ;" (2) "Keep interactions with the ill
person as brief as possible;" (3) "Ask the ill traveler to wear a
face mask if it can be tolerated and one is available [and i]f a
face mask cannot be tolerated, provide tissues and ask the ill
person to cover his or her mouth and nose when coughing or
sneezing;" and (4) "Practice good hand hygiene and encourage
others, including the ill person, to do the same."1 67
165 Interim Guidance for Management of Influenza-Like Illness aboard Com-
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B. WAS THE U.S. RESPONSE TO SWINE FLU ADEQUATE?
1. Recommendations v. Regulations
Despite the guidelines discussed above, an article in the Los
Angeles Times reported that sick passengers were not being sepa-
rated from other passengers or being asked to wear a mask."'s
On multiple flights operated by various airlines, flight attend-
ants did nothing to intervene in situations involving an obvi-
ously ill passenger.169 For example, on one United Airlines
flight, flight attendants failed to provide a mask to a passenger
with a "phlegmy cough."170 Flight attendants on flights oper-
ated by numerous airlines, including both American Airlines
and Southwest Airlines, told passengers who were interested in
receiving a mask that no masks were available.171 In response to
the airlines' failure to provide masks to sick passengers, six air-
lines all had the same defense: "although they typically have
masks available on flights, no policy requires flight attendants to
offer them to ill passengers." 17 2 Another more practical concern
raised by an editor at smarttravel.com, Tim Winship, is that the
recommendation that the ill passenger be placed six feet away
from other passengers would be extremely difficult (if not im-
possible) to comply with, given the crowded nature of aircraft.173
Therefore, it is questionable how helpful the CDC guidelines
have been in preventing the transmission of swine flu on
airplanes.
One group upset by the FAA's approach to the swine flu out-
break was the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA). Following
the outbreak, the AFA voiced its concerns with the FAA's re-
sponse in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Aviation.174
Immediately following the H1NI outbreak, the AFA sent a letter
to the FAA requesting the FAA to take specific steps to prevent
the spread of infectious disease."17  For instance, the AFA re-
quested that the FAA require that "airlines provide flight attend-
ants with non-latex gloves and masks ... ,allow flight attendants
168 Rong-Gong Lin II, Air Crews Aren't Giving Face Masks, Despite Rules, L.A.






174 Aviation Consumer Issues, supra note 3, at 22-23 (statement of Patricia A.
Friend).
175 Id. at 22.
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with flu-like symptoms themselves to call in sick without risk of
discipline, . . . develop, implement, and enforce passenger
screening standards," and ensure that airplanes have proper
hand-washing equipment."' Instead of implementing the
above regulations, the FAA "turned a deaf ear" to the AFA's de-
mands.1 7 7 The AFA was not satisfied with this response, and in
testimony to the House Subcommittee on Aviation, it empha-
sized its concern that airline management is more concerned
with the appearance of flight attendants than with the health of
the public and the flight crew.17 8
The FAA's reasons for resorting to guidelines and recommen-
dations instead of regulations during the swine flu outbreak are
likely very similar to its reasons (discussed above) for hesitating
to require that airlines install expensive equipment.1 7 9 Such
regulations would increase costs for airlines at a time when their
profits are low, due not only to the swine flu but also to high fuel
costs and the current economic recession.' With that said, the
costs associated with providing masks and gloves to flight attend-
ants seem likely to be extraordinarily minimal"a" and may be
worth the increased employee health and passenger security
that such measures would produce. On the other hand, it is also
foreseeable that having flight attendants wear masks could cre-
ate fear among consumers, who might take that as evidence that
it is not safe to fly. At the very least, masks should always be
176 Id. at 22-23.
17 No Cabin Safety Changes Despite Spread of H1N1 Virus, 23 AIR SAFEThY WK., June
29, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12490944.
18 Aviation Consumer Issues, supra note 3, at 23 (statement of Patricia A.
Friend).
[T]he airline management in this Country seems more concerned
about the appearance and views of flight attendants as marketing
tools rather than our proper role as safety and security profession-
als. The health of flight attendants and the traveling public should
not be subject to the marketing concerns of airline management.
Id.
179 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (regarding the FAA's hesitation
in implementing regulations to install new equipment).
180 Terry Maxon, No. 1 on Our Top 10 List for 2009: The Airline Industry Fights for
Its Life, DALLAs MORNING NEws AIRLINE Biz BLOG (Dec. 31, 2009, 6:00 AM), http:/
/aviationblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/12/no-i-on-our-top-10-list-for-20.
html.
181 Daniel J. DeNoon, Swine Flu (HiN1) and Face Masks (July 23, 2009),
http://www.webmd.com/cold-and-flu/features/swine-flu-hin1-and-face-masks
(one box of fifty face masks costs ten to fifteen dollars); Synthetic Gloves, http://
www.dontheglove.com/syntheticgloves (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (one box of
1,000 gloves costs $3.95).
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available on board for those passengers who would like to wear
them and for flight attendants that must deal with sick
passengers.
2. Contrasting the U.S. Response to Swine Flu with Hong Kong's
Response to SARS
While the United States took a non-interference approach in
the wake of the -swine flu, other countries, such as Japan and
China, took a very different approach, screening all incoming
passengers for symptoms of the flu, requiring temperature
checks, and implementing other various health screening
measures.'8 2
In evaluating the effectiveness of the U.S. approach to the
swine flu pandemic, it is interesting to compare the U.S. ap-
proach to swine flu with the approach taken by the Hong Kong
government in response to the 2003 SARS outbreak. When the
SARS outbreak began in Asia, Hong Kong adopted several mea-
sures to contain the virus and to prevent the international trans-
mission of SARS.'8 3 In response to the outbreak, Hong Kong
quickly implemented legislation that contained provisions al-
lowing for: "prevent[ion of] the departure of any person having
a history of contact with SARS-infected persons or persons sus-
pected of having SARS;" medical examinations and body tem-
perature screening "of passengers both arriving in and
departing from Hong Kong;" and detention of any person sus-
pected of having SARS.18 4 " [A] 11 passengers arriving [in Hong
Kong] were asked to complete mandatory health declaration
forms," and all "were required to undergo temperature checks
... using infra-red screening devices designed to detect the pres-
ence of a fever.""" These temperature checks were mandatory
not only for passengers but also for all airline crew." The dec-
laration form required passengers to disclose "the presence of a
fever" or "any history of contact with SARS-infected persons.""
In addition, similar to the U.S. Travel Health Campaign, "the
Hong Kong Government commenced a public education cam-
182 CDC, Announcement: Possible 2009 HINI Flu Screening for International
Travelers (Jan. 20, 2010), http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/content/news-announce
ments/delays-HIN1-screening.aspx.
18 Chan & Schloenhardt, supra note 5, at 485-86.
184 Id. at 491-92.
185 Id. at 496.
186 Id. at 497.
187 Id. at 498.
462 [75
HINi SWINE INFLUENZA
paign" to inform travelers about SARS and the different mea-
sures which had been adopted."' In its effort to stop the spread
of the disease, Hong Kong went above and beyond the recom-
mendation of the WHO by screening not only all departing trav-
elers but also all passengers arriving in Hong Kong from other
parts of the world."'
Prior to Hong Kong's implementation of the above proce-
dures, approximately 6% of the SARS cases in Hong Kong were
believed to be imported by travelers entering the country; fol-
lowing the introduction of the above measures, no new im-
ported cases occurred. 9 0 Furthermore, there were no reports
of in-flight SARS transmission following the introduction of the
screening procedures."9 '
However, the screening measures only detected two SARS
cases.19 2 This prompted criticism from some who felt that the
"measures were overly expensive, unnecessarily intrusive and
time-consuming to the traveller, while producing very little ef-
fect."' Critics claim that while the border control and screen-
ing measures "helped freeze SARS in its tracks . . . they also
drained away billons of dollars in lost trade and tourism."194
Critics also argue that such screening measures create a level of
panic that surpasses the real problem. 1 9 5 However, as Chan and
Schloendhardt point out, this criticism seems to ignore the fact
that the SARS outbreak began with one infected passenger who
caused the disease to spread to thirty countries within a matter
of weeks.196 Also, it is not known to what extent the measures
188 Compare id. at 499 with Travel Health Campaign, supra note 163.
189 Chan & Schloenhardt, supra note 5, at 500; see also WHO, Update 11-
WHO Recommends New Measures to Prevent Travel Related Spread of SARS
(Mar. 27, 2003), http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_03_27/en/ [here-
inafter Update 11].
190 WHO, Update 74 - Global Decline in Cases and Deaths Continues (June 5,
2003), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_06_05/en/.
191 WHO, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Report by the Secretariat, at 3,
WHO Doc. EB113/33 Rev. 1 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://apps.who.int/
gb/ebwha/pdfjfiles/EB1 13/eebl 1333rl.pdf.
192 Chan & Schloenhardt, supra note 5, at 503.
19 Id. at 504.
194 Charles Piller, In SARS Aftermath, the WHO's in Charge, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 13,
2003, at Al.
195 Id.
196 WHO, Update 83 - One Hundred Days into the Outbreak (June 18, 2003),
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_06_18/en/.
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served to discourage those with symptoms of SARS from travel-
ing, thus contributing to the containment of the disease.1'9 7
Keeping the actions taken by Hong Kong in mind, a question
arises as to whether the WHO should have recommended that
Mexico and the United States take a similar approach in regards
to the HINI outbreak. The measures taken in Hong Kong,
while costly, did contribute to the eradication of the disease in a
relatively short period of time and with a limited number of
deaths.' Also, some of the procedures, such as temperature
screening and health declaration forms, do not interfere with
international travel to a great degree. While they might take
minimal amounts of time away from the traveler, the procedures
are not overly invasive or time-consuming. Although it would be
difficult to say now whether such measures would have halted,
or at least delayed, the spread of H1N1, it is worth taking the
different approaches and their respective outcomes into
consideration.
C. QUESTIONS TO THINK ABOUT AND IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE
What should be done to promote healthy air travel? First, the
FAA could force the airlines to take steps to make air travel
healthier by promulgating regulations relating to air quality.
For instance, the FAA could require that all airlines equip
planes with the new AirManager technology in order to improve
cabin air quality and to reduce in-flight transmission of commu-
nicable disease.'" Other possibilities would be requiring that
filters and ducting be treated, requiring that new planes be built
with no-recirculation zones, or requiring that new planes be de-
signed so that the air flows from the bottom up."oo Despite the
perceived benefits of requiring airlines to comply with all or
some of the above measures, the imposition of such regulations
would likely face stiff resistance from the airline industry, which
tends to disfavor these types of costly actions and refuses to ac-
197 See Chan & Schloenhardt, supra note 5, at 502.
198 World Health Report 2003, supra note 11, at 75 (attributing 916 deaths to the
SARS outbreak); WHO, China's Latest SARS Outbreak Has Been Contained, But
Biosafety Concerns Remain - Update 7 (May 18, 2004), http://www.who.int/csr/
don/2004_05_18a/en/index.html (explaining that the human chain of SARS
transmission has been broken).
-n See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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knowledge any air quality problems to begin with.2 0 1 Therefore,
less intrusive and costly options such as requiring availability of
masks and hand sanitizers may be better received.
As mentioned above, the goal of the IHRs is to contain the
spread of disease with the least interference with international
trade and travel.2 0 2 In the case of the U.S. government's han-
dling of the swine flu and the WHO's recommendations regard-
ing the same, the interference with international travel was
almost non-existent. 2 03 People continued to engage freely in in-
ternational travel despite the WHO's characterization of HINI
as a "public health emergency of international concern." Not
surprisingly, it did not take long for the HINI influenza to tran-
scend the North American continent and to spread around the
world. 05 Is this the proper balance intended by the IHRs? Why
were the WHO recommendations so much more stringent in
the case of SARS just six years earlier?206 One possible explana-
tion would be the serious nature of SARS as compared to the
mild symptoms associated with the swine flu.2 0 7 But what about
those individuals at risk for complications from HINI? Where
do you draw the line in balancing health risks and potential in-
terference with the world economy? Is this even a proper ques-
tion to ask? Although the goal sounds like a good one, it is
difficult to imagine how allowing any travel would be justified in
the case of a very serious and deadly disease outbreak.
While there are serious economic consequences to restricting
trade and travel (especially to the aviation industry), were there
to be a serious pandemic, the cost of having such a high number
of ill or dying people would be equally, if not more, devastating
to the world economy. The SARS pandemic, discussed above,
resulted in an estimated $30-$140 million in economic costs
201 See Industry Questions NPRM on ADS-B Out, supra note 140 (discussing avia-
tion industry hesitation regarding FAA requiring ADS-B Out, due to the fact that
the equipment is too expensive and the FAA provides little incentive for volun-
tary equipage); see also FAA's Proposed SDR Revisions Receive Scathing Reviews, supra
note 140 (discussing airline complaints that requirement is excessively burden-
some "with little value to the safety"); Letter from James C. May, supra note 144.
202 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 157 & 164 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also Update 11, supra note
189.
207 Yanzhong Huang, The HIN1 Virus: Varied Local Responses to a Global Spread,
YALE GLOBAL, Sept. 1, 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/h1n1-virus-
varied-local-responses-global-spread.
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due to cancelled travel and decreased investment in Asia with
"service industries and airlines suffer[ing] the greatest losses. "208
While this is a lot of money, the potential losses that could have
resulted had SARS not been rapidly contained can only be
imagined.
The proper balance between health and interference with
trade and travel likely falls somewhere between Hong Kong's ap-
proach to SARS in 2003 and the U.S. approach to swine flu in
2009. It seems that minimally invasive procedures that could
greatly reduce the transmission of disease on flights should not
only be recommended in the case of a pandemic but required.
The risks associated with allowing a pandemic to spread purely
because it is not in the economic interest of airlines to comply
with guidelines are not only irresponsible but potentially unethi-
cal. Requirements such as providing masks, treating air filters,
and providing hand sanitizer on flights are all simple steps that
could potentially go far in reducing in-flight transmission of dis-
ease. Furthermore, if subsequent studies suggest that there are
problems with air quality, the FAA needs to be proactive by re-
quiring that changes be made for the health of both passengers
and crew, either by installing new technology or changing cabin-
ventilation-system design.
Similarly, temperature checks and declaration forms provide
protection against the spread of disease with only minimal inter-
ference to international trade and traffic. The FAA should re-
quire that the aviation industry take such steps in an epidemic-
type situation, when there is a possibility that those arriving or
departing from the United States are infected with a communi-
cable disease.
Another question to be asked in preparing for future
epidemics is who should be responsible for preventing the trans-
mission and spread of disease on airplanes? In the case of the
swine flu, the United States placed virtually all responsibility
with the passengers. 209 This is concerning in light of the fact
that one passenger's irresponsible behavior could ultimately re-
sult in the international spread of disease and thousands or even
millions of deaths worldwide. With these sorts of serious conse-
quences in mind, a more sensible approach would be to place at
208 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Report by the Secretariat, supra note
191, at 2.
209 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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least some responsibility for the prevention of the spread and
transmission of disease on the government and the airlines.
In conclusion, there are numerous questions to be considered
with regard to the international and national response to the
HIN1 pandemic. Balancing health against interference with
the world economy and international travel is not an easy thing
to do, and it is difficult to know where to draw the line. In the
case of the 2009 pandemic, the line was drawn more on the side
of the economy than on the side of health, which may or may
not have been the correct response. It is hard to say if any ac-
tion short of closing down the borders of North America would
have halted the spread of HINI. As far as the IHRs are con-
cerned, the United States definitely interfered with trade and
travel to the least extent possible but was not as successful in
achieving the first part of the goal-namely preventing the in-
ternational spread of disease. After this pandemic is over, both
international and national bodies will most definitely need to
meet to determine what they can do to prevent and contain fu-
ture pandemics. Luckily, most of those infected with HIN1 only
faced mild symptoms,2 1 0 but the next disease could be much
more lethal. In that scenario, the line may need to be drawn
more in favor of health than the economy.
210 See Huang, supra note 207.
2010] 467
DIS
nAL.6ls"
